Mechanismy plateb za kapacitu a optimální design trhu s elektřinou

Sobotka, Ladislav

EU electricity markets are facing fundamental challenges as a result of the EU goal to increase the share of the renewable energy sources. This policy negatively influences profitability of the conventional producers known theoretically as "missing money" problem. As the conventional plants are crucial to offset the variability of renewable, this policy puts the stability of the whole grid at risk in long-term under the current electricity market design. The thesis tests and confirms the hypothesis that there is currently a "missing money" effect on the German energy market through a dynamic programming model. Secondly, three types of the capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) are implemented (capacity payments, strategic reserve and capacity auction) in order to deal with "missing money" which mostly eliminates the missing money problem depending on the setting. The most effective CRM seems be the capacity auction model as the price is set dynamically by the market players and not arbitrarily by central regulator. The thesis further supports the creation of the demand flexibility scheme due to the expected low costs. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

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