Název: Talent rewards, talent uncertainty, and career tracks
Autoři: Jeong, Byeongju
Typ dokumentu: Výzkumné zprávy
Rok: 2020
Jazyk: eng
Edice: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, svazek: 673
Abstrakt: I present a model in which (1) a more talent-demanding task increases both rewards for high talent and the penalty for low talent due to a greater fixed cost of production, and (2) individual talent is task-specific and talent updates occur only for tasks near the attempted task, which implies a task-sequence problem in which the initial task constrains subsequent task choices. Rising talent rewards and penalty stemming from a rising scale economy\nmotivate young workers to choose a more talent-demanding task, raise the failure rate (i.e., the probability of the updated talent being lower than the exit threshold), and concentrate income gains in a diminishing fraction of high-talent workers. Rising talent rewards and penalty also increase the share of young workers subject to binding minimum currentincome constraints, thus increasing the dispersion of tasks among young workers. The model sheds light on the rising stratification of careers among young workers and the rising polarization of the residual labor income distribution (i.e., the labor income distribution controlling for observable worker characteristics such as education and age).
Klíčová slova: career track; talent reward; talent uncertainty

Instituce: Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR (web)
Informace o dostupnosti dokumentu: Dokument je dostupný na externích webových stránkách.
Externí umístění souboru: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp673.pdf
Původní záznam: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0311659

Trvalý odkaz NUŠL: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-432267


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